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I.

INTRODUCTION

In reflecting on the recent Supreme Court opinion in Foster v. Chatman, 1
I was struck by how the Court announced the correct ruling, but failed to
capture and comprehend the true reality that racially motivated peremptory
strikes still exist and flourish in our nation’s judicial system. 2 Condemning the
30-year-old actions of two Georgia prosecutors legitimizes our system of
justice, as many will find comfort in the remedy, 3 but does little to eliminate
the tragic occurrence of a person of color being excluded from a jury. Thirty
years of Batson-influenced jurisprudence has been ineffective in changing the
reality that black citizens are barred from juries based on the color of their
skin and black litigants, especially criminal defendants, are deprived of true
due process and equal protection. 4 This Essay is a reminder of how the
∗
Deputy District Defender of the St. Louis County Trial Office of the Missouri State
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personal opinions and beliefs. Special thanks to Ann H. MacDonald for her substantial assistance
in editing and researching this Essay.
1. See generally Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
2. See Object Anyway, Radiolab Presents: More Perfect, WNYC (July 16, 2016),
www.wnyc.org/story/object-anyway; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 116–20 (2010). For this reason, some scholars
have proposed eliminating peremptory challenges. See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 1585, 1607–10 (2012).
3. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1749 (“[T]he reasoning provided by Lanier has no grounding in fact.”).
4. See Object Anyway, supra note 2 (stating that no Tennessee appellate court has ever
reversed a conviction on the basis of a Batson challenge); see also State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326,
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evolution of rulings in Batson, 5 Miller-El, 6 and Foster 7 raised awareness of open
and intentional racial exclusion but failed to combat or even comprehend the
modern face of judicially-sanctioned explicit and implicit racism. 8
In Foster, the Supreme Court determined that the “prosecutors were
motivated in substantial part by race” when they struck two potential jurors
from hearing the capital murder case against Timothy Foster. 9 In a 7 to 1
decision, written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court reversed and remanded
Foster’s conviction, citing numerous examples of how white jurors who were
similarly situated to the excluded black jurors were not struck by prosecutors
from the all-white jury. 10 The opinion noted “shifting explanations, the
misrepresentations of the record, and the persistent focus on race in the
prosecution’s file” as evidence of how the peremptory strikes were improperly
motivated. 11 It is truly unfortunate that this phenomenon of open and explicit
racial intolerance is still in existence 30 years after Batson decision came
down. 12 What is even more unfortunate, however, is that the Court did not
acknowledge how attitudes of exclusion are less intentional today and more
nuanced, implicit, and rationalized. Black defendants in 2016 face
prosecutors who are less engaged in open discrimination but more likely
impacted by their own implicit beliefs and comforted by false rationalizations
of racial tolerance. 13 The Foster ruling disregarded the new face of exclusion
while it engaged in the relatively simple task (aided by a cache of records) of
combating a detectable case of intentional racism in jury selection.
II.

THE FAILINGS OF BATSON

The Foster ruling provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
restructure the Batson standard by allowing a reviewing court to consider the
impact of subconscious racial beliefs on both litigators and judges. I was
optimistic that the Court would take the lead in validating a recent opinion
by the Supreme Court of Washington, which called for the “replace[ment of]
Batson’s ‘purposeful discrimination’ requirement with a requirement that
necessarily accounts for and alerts trial courts to the problem of unconscious

334–36 (Wash. 2013).
5. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. See generally Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
7. See generally Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of
case law post-Batson, see James J. Tomkovicz, Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to Equal
Protection Regulation of Peremptory Jury Challenges, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1393, 1406–23 (2012).
8. See generally Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229 (1993).
9. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755.
10. See id. at 1750–51, 1752–54.
11. Id. at 1754.
12. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 118.
13. See Object Anyway, supra note 2.
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bias.” 14 That court proposed for example that
it might make sense to require a Batson challenge to be sustained if
there is a reasonable probability that race was a factor in the exercise
of the peremptory or where the judge finds it is more likely than not
that, but for the defendant’s race, the peremptory would not have
been exercised. 15
The court suggested that such a standard “would take the focus off of the
credibility and integrity of the attorneys and ease the accusatory strain of
sustaining a Batson challenge.” 16 Though such an approach is not the only way
to address this issue, 17 it would be a start and give judges a way to address
discrimination without confronting the striking attorney. Unfortunately, in
utilizing an archaic and outdated analysis, the Supreme Court ignored the
significant role that implicit bias played in the prosecutors’ decisions in
Foster 18 and, ultimately, in our system of justice.
Both state and federal judges from across the nation are seeking clarity
on this issue. For example, now-Senior Federal District Judge Mark Bennett,
sitting in Sioux City, Iowa, has observed that “[b]ecause Batson is ineffectual
in addressing bias in jury selection, it permits implicit bias—and probably
even explicit bias—to have an impact on jury selection.” 19 State appellate
judges have recently written inspiring, well-researched, and eloquent
opinions detailing how hidden racial beliefs on the part of prosecutors have
directly impacted the composition of juries in cases before their courts. 20
Unfortunately, these opinions are imbedded with the tragic
disappointment of judicial reality. As Judge Van Amberg writes: “I concur in
result with the majority opinion because Batson requires a finding of
purposeful discrimination and, deferring to the trial court as our standard of
review requires, I cannot firmly conclude from this record that the trial court’s
ruling is clearly erroneous.” 21 These unfortunate affirmations of lower court
verdicts have reduced appellate judges to merely “acknowledging the reality
of unconscious bias in our courtrooms,” and hoping for a “national

14. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 339 (Wash. 2013).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For example, Professor Henry L. Chambers, Jr. has suggested a test that assumes a state
actor intended the “natural and probable consequences” of his or her action. Henry L. Chambers,
Jr., Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 611, 625–27 (2004).
18. See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (stating that “[i]ndeed, at times
the State has been downright indignant” when objecting that race was not a factor).
19. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems
of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 149, 165 (2010).
20. See, e.g., State v. Rashad, 484 S.W.3d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
21. Id. at 859 (Amburg, J., concurring).
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conversation seeking alternatives to Batson.” 22 Sadly, the United States
Supreme Court commemorated the 30th anniversary of the Batson decision
with an opinion that failed to advance this essential conversation. 23
III.

RATIONALIZED RACIAL EXCLUSION

All human beings develop a unique racial identity status when their egos
interpret interactions with individuals from another race. 24 This identity
status helps protect our sense of “self-esteem” and “influences how [we]
interact[] with individuals in different racial groups.” 25 Litigators today likely
have matured past an identity status that is “oblivious[] to racism and one’s
participation in it” to the relatively more mature status of “deceptive
tolerance” 26 and a deceptive understanding of the plight of other races. 27
Tomorrow’s Batson violation will present at the intersection of implicit and
explicit beliefs, masked by false rationalizations of racial acceptance.
In trial practice, deceptive tolerance is evidenced when opposing counsel
makes a Batson challenge and litigators protest that they are not racist and
object to the accusation that they are deliberately striking individuals based
on race. 28 Today, black litigants are confronted with prosecutors who are
unaware of their own implicit intolerance and who are oblivious to the impact
of the years of cumulative cultural messaging that portrayed people of color
as different. 29 The late Justice Scalia acknowledged the existence of this belief
system when he dissented in Powers v. Ohio and wrote: “[A]ll groups tend to
have particular sympathies . . . towards their own group members.” 30 When I
first read Scalia’s dissent, I was alarmed by his characterization of how
individual actions are based on membership in a racial group. But in the
weeks following his death, I reflected on how his writings—when viewed in
the context of modern research on race and bias—are a rare and honest
admission of how he personally, and our system of justice generally, has yet to
mature up the racial identity scale beyond deceptive tolerance.
Today’s Batson violation is shrouded in a cloak of rationalization, with
trial attorneys consciously believing their actions are not motivated by bias but

22. Id. at 862.
23. See generally Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737.
24. Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 166–69 (2004).
25. Id. at 167.
26. Id. Deceptive tolerance is an ego status that represents how an individual remains
intellectually committed to one’s own racial group while demonstrating a “deceptive tolerance”
of non-white groups. Id.
27. Id.; see also Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1476–83 (2012).
28. See, e.g., Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755.
29. SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT
PRESIDENTS, CONTROL MARKETS, WAGE WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES 72–73 (2010).
30. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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by the advancement of a greater good. 31 This rationalization is evidenced
when prosecutors ask questions in voir dire targeting the heart of the black
experience in this country. For example, prosecutors may ask potential black
jurors if they have had negative experiences with law enforcement because of
their race. 32 Many rationalize this questioning as comparable to asking if a
potential black juror has been a victim of a crime, but in reality, exclusions
based on such questions mark the continued victimization of a black juror
simply because they were victimized by their government in the past. 33 This
government-sanctioned victimization is exacerbated when prosecutors in
black communities, unbeknownst to potential jurors, use their extensive
resources to run arrest records of said jurors, who were never convicted, and
troll for answers that can be portrayed as dishonest or ambiguous in a strike
for cause. 34
Allowing attorneys to ask jurors if they have a friend or family member in
jail or the penitentiary is another way our system masks prosecutors’ implicit
or rationalized bias because a disproportionate number of incarcerated
individuals are African American. 35 Foster never asked this crucial question: is
striking a person from a jury because they have experiences based on their
race the same as striking an individual because of their race? I fail to see the
distinction. Unfortunately, the Batson standard is an inadequate tool in
preventing this tactic, and the tactics of bias to be utilized post-Foster.
IV.

STRATEGIES OF RACIAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST-FOSTER ERA

Tomorrow’s tools of exclusion will be more complex, subtle and, at times,
more undetectable. I have observed the following trial tactics evolve in the
past few years and I anticipate courts will confront these methods of
circumventing Batson in the future.
First, in the post-Foster era, courts will confront the issue of trial attorneys
opting not to utilize their allowed peremptory strikes as a way to exclude
people of color. 36 For example, a prosecutor who is implicitly or intentionally
attempting to strike individuals based on race, gender, or ethnicity will notice
a targeted group is less represented in the first section of the assembled voir
dire panel. Thus, if he or she uses all allowed strikes, they will have some or
more of this group present on the final jury. Currently, an attorney may opt

31. See Object Anyway, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Questions Arise Over Criminal Background Searches of Jurors in D.C.
Superior Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/questionsarise-over-criminal-background-searches-of-jurors-in-dc-superior-court/2013/12/08/fa612fec-4e1311e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html.
35. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 188–89.
36. See, e.g., State v. Paleo, 5 P.3d 276, 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), vacated, 22 P.3d 35 (Ariz.
2001).
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not to use all of his or her preemptory strikes. 37 Unfortunately, this tactic
serves a racially-motivated prosecutor’s interests by excluding people of color
from the panel and, at the same time, avoiding a Batson challenge.
Second, rationalized racism in jury selection in the post-Foster era will no
longer present with all white juries. Some litigators practice a more nuanced
form of exclusion by targeting individuals with certain intersectionalized
traits. 38 For instance, some prosecutors will rationalize that black women will
be tired of crime in their communities but black males will be sympathetic to
the defendant or hate the police. 39 In addition, strikes based on youth will, in
reality, be strikes based on youth, gender, and race, with prosecutors
harboring the false fear of black men relating to one another and
sympathizing with the plight of the accused. 40 Compounding this problem is
that when questions of exclusion are raised, the presence of one or a few black
members of the jury will be trumpeted as proof of race-neutral actions. 41
Third, other litigators will engage in the practice of citing the
involvement of black professionals as evidence of proper conduct when
defending an act of exclusion. For example, in denying relief for Timothy
Foster, the Georgia habeas court noted that the prosecutor’s investigator,
“Mr. Lundy, [was] himself African American,” 42 when it outlined facts
demonstrating no bias existed in the State’s strikes. Black litigators are not
immune from the institutional pressures and cultural messaging that
promotes an irrational fear of a case being lost if people of color are allowed
on the jury. 43 The stereotyping of black professionals as being unconditionally
protective of black jurors is evidence of the racially rationalized and implicit
beliefs that permeate our system. 44
The current framework for addressing discrimination in jury selection,
with its focus on proving intentional conduct by the striking attorney, does
little to address how these tactics, formed by implicit bias, cause the improper
37. State v. Paleo, 22 P.3d 35 (Ariz. 2001).
38. See Object Anyway, supra note 2, for an interview with ACLU Deputy Legal Director
Jeffery Robinson describing his perception of the belief system his parents would bring to jury
service. This generalization of attitudes, based on race and gender, is arguably shared by a
number of prosecutors.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1991) (“The district court erred
in ruling that a Batson violation did not occur since members of the defendants’ racial group were
seated on the jury.”).
42. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Foster v.
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8348).
43. See VEDANTAM, supra note 29, at 72–73.
44. See State v. Rashad, 484 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (finding “[t]he facts of
this case do not even hint at a motive to discriminate” in part because “the victim and [the
defendant] were African-American[,] . . . [t]he investigating police detective was AfricanAmerican[,] . . . [t]he family witnesses were African-American[, and] . . . “[t]he case did not
present any issues of cross-racial identification.”).
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removal of minority jurors from juries.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the 30th anniversary of the Batson decision approached (April 30,
2016), I spent the prior week reflecting on the Supreme Court’s anticipated
Foster v. Chatman ruling. I contemplated if the Court would adopt the more
logical and impactful standard of denying a peremptory strike when “more
likely than not that, but for the defendant’s race, the peremptory would not
have been exercised.” 45 It did not. For decades I have witnessed open bigotry
and racial biases plague our system of justice in both my community and
throughout the nation. But my experience with racial attitudes inside the walls
of the courthouse has been more nuanced and less explicit. In a majority of
my trials, I have witnessed people of color struck from jury panels due to the
color of their skin. I have also seen prosecutors who I considered to be
progressive and enlightened individuals offer questionable race-neutral
reasons as they rationalized striking African Americans from my black client’s
jury. In defending their strikes, many protested that they are “not racist” and
objected to being questioned about their actions. After hearing this objection
on several occasions, I soon understood that many of the prosecutors
genuinely believed their actions were not racially motivated. My black
clients—who were facing all-white juries—knew, however, that race had
played a significant role in the selection processes. Given the circumstances
of Mr. Foster’s case, the Supreme Court should have recognized that Batson is
not actually addressing explicit or implicit discrimination in jury selection and
offered a new approach to addressing this form of pervasive discrimination.

45.

State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 339 (Wash. 2013).

